Following a scarcity of dollar funding available internationally to banks and financial institutions, in December 2007 the Federal Reserve began to establish or expand Temporary Reciprocal Currency Arrangements with fourteen foreign central banks. These central banks had the capacity to use these swap facilities to provide dollar liquidity to institutions in their jurisdictions. This paper presents the developments in the dollar swap facilities through the end of 2009. The facilities were a response to dollar funding shortages outside the United States during a period of market dysfunction. Formal research, as well as more descriptive accounts, suggests that the dollar swap lines among central banks were effective at reducing the dollar funding pressures abroad and stresses in money markets. The central bank dollar swap facilities are an important part of the toolbox for dealing with systemic liquidity disruptions.
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Introduction
The Reciprocal Currency Arrangements outstanding with foreign central banks (CB dollar swaps hereafter), which began in December 2007 when the first swap lines of the crisis period were established, were an important part of global policy cooperation that continued through the end of 2009. In this article we provide an overview of the CB dollar swap facilities, show how they changed in breadth and volume as funding conditions in the market and through these central bank facilities evolved, and assess the economic research aimed at documenting the efficacy of the CB dollar swaps. We conclude that the CB dollar swap facilities are an important part of a toolbox for dealing with systemic liquidity disruptions.
We begin by providing context for the CB dollar swaps, examining the costs of U.S. dollar funding in different locations. Section 2 focuses on the prices of dollars in private markets and across tenors. Broad measures used to compare the relative cost of funds in private markets versus through official liquidity facilities include the spread between the London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR) and the Overnight Index Swap (OIS) rate, and foreign exchange (FX) swap implied basis spreads, which reflect the cost of funding dollar positions by borrowing foreign currency and then converting that foreign currency into dollars via an FX swap. Another piece of evidence of disruptions to dollar markets is drawn from the intraday federal funds market. We compare the average price of federal funds during morning hours with the average price over afternoon trading. The differential cost was normally close to zero in the pre-crisis period through August 2007, and thereafter evolved to reflect a substantial premium paid for federal funds acquired in morning trading. This morning premium persisted through December 2008, with highly elevated levels in the aftermath of the Lehman bankruptcy. Among alternative explanations provided, we note this spread can be interpreted partially as a "Europe premium" that evolved over the course of the crisis due to dollar demand by European banks that lacked a natural dollar deposit base for meeting dollar funding needs.
Next, we provide a detailed overview of the CB dollar swap history (Section 3). In brief, the Federal Reserve's program for providing dollars to foreign markets evolved extensively since it began in 2007, both with respect to the number of countries with swap agreements and with respect to the amount of dollars made available abroad through these arrangements. The tenor of funds made available through the dollar auctions also evolved over time, from initially being for tenors of up to one month, then extended to tenors of up to three months, and then returned back to primarily shorter tenor auctions. We show that, at the program's peak, longer-term swaps dominated the total amount outstanding. Net dollars outstanding through the CB dollar swaps peaked at nearly $600 billion near the end of 2008, as banks hoarded liquidity over the year end, with some of this demand for dollars unwinding in the post year-end period. Amounts outstanding at the dollar swap facilities declined to under $100 billion by June 2009, to less than We show the differential costs of accessing dollars at the numerous official liquidity facilities, with the effective "all-in" cost of dollars at the various central banks deriving from the specific facility designs and collateral policies. We also show that while funds through the dollar swap facilities were competitively priced in the early stages of the crisis, as money market functioning improved, the dollars acquired through overseas dollar swap facilities became available at a higher rate relative to the Federal Reserve's Term Auction Facility (TAF) and the market rate for most borrowers. Dollar swap facility funds were typically priced close to 100 basis points higher than the dollars that banks, including some foreign banking organizations in the United States, obtained at the TAF. Indeed with funds at the TAF priced below indicative market rates for many banks, and with the minimum bid rate at the TAF the same as the rate of interest on reserves, participation at TAF remained broad through much of 2009. By contrast, the dollar auctions of other central banks had dollars priced above market rates that were available to many banks. Overall, taking into account the consequences of the auction structures and collateral considerations, we observe that the continued participation of some banks in the CB dollar swap auctions through the first half of 2009 reflected persistent pockets of dollar market supply shortages. This suggested continued credit tiering among banking counterparties and potentially some self-selection of less creditworthy banks who continued to seek liquidity from 3 the central banks auctioning dollars.
We conclude this discussion of the dollar swap facilities with a discussion of the evidence aimed at identifying the effects of the dollar swap facilities on liquidity conditions in financial markets in the United States and abroad (Section 4). First, we discuss anecdotal accounts from market participants -including dealers, brokers, and bank treasurers -who argue that the CB dollar swaps contributed to improved conditions in markets. Second, we argue that despite the overall improvement, there remained credit tiering in access to liquidity. One piece of suggestive evidence comes from the Euro Interbank Offered Rate (EURIBOR) panel, which suggests that FX swap implied basis spreads on dollars were quite different across banks with different strength ratings. By comparing the interest cost of euros for stronger, more moderate, and lower rated financial institutions in Europe, we conclude that the degree of credit tiering peaked in November 2008 and remained elevated well into the third quarter of 2009. Third, we discuss the key findings, as well as the limitations, of a range of relevant econometric studies. In brief, the main methodology utilized is a type of event study which tracks the consequences for financial variables of announcements about liquidity facilities, whether these pertain to amounts to be offered, scope of access, or actual auction dates. Based on effects on financial market spreads, the studies conclude that the TAF and CB dollar swaps have played important roles in bringing down the cost of funds, especially when dollar liquidity conditions were most stressed. However, while these results are compelling, we note the difficulty in using such studies as conclusive metrics of market effects.
Section 5 concludes the paper with more forward-looking comments on the importance of currency swap facilities as part of the toolbox for central banks dealing with crisis management and resolution.
Pressures in Dollar Funding Markets
Before turning to the evolution of the dollar swap facilities, in this section we provide an overview of the initial pressures in dollar funding markets, and the evolution over time of these pressures. We consider some measures of the cost of funds across markets and tenors, showing how these evolved over the period covered by the CB dollar swaps. 4 2.1. Demand for Dollars. To provide perspective on the pressures banks faced in the crisis period, we begin with the issue of how many U.S. dollars foreign banks needed and how these dollar needs were satisfied. In brief, both the high level of U.S. dollar-denominated assets that European banks' were exposed to, both on-and off-balance sheet, and their heavy reliance on short-term, wholesale markets to fund these assets exacerbated the significant strains in funding European Union, United Kingdom, and Swiss banks' on-balance sheet dollar exposures were estimated to exceed $8 trillion in 2008. Prior to the crisis, this exposure was funded from money market funds ($1 trillion), central banks ($500 billion), and the foreign exchange swap market ($800 billion), while the remainder was funded by interbank borrowing, flows from U.S.-based affiliates, and other sources.
2 Off-balance sheet exposures to other contingent lines of credit and wholesale-funded conduits likely intensified the demand for dollars among European financial institutions. European banks (and other non-U.S. banks) lack a dollar-denominated retail deposit base and had grown increasingly reliant on wholesale funding sources to meet these expanding U.S. dollar liquidity needs.
Nearly all of these funding sources came under extreme stress in Fall 2008 as escalating credit and liquidity concerns evolved into a much broader systemic issue after the failure of Lehman Brothers, as has already been well-documented. In particular, the offshore wholesale market for dollars -i.e., the eurodollar market -and the FX swap market experienced particularly heightened strains. These strains were evident in the commonly cited LIBOR-OIS One hypothesis is that a morning premium reflected a "Europe premium," which arose from a structural shortage of dollars. Of course, other factors also potentially played a significant role in the deviations between morning and afternoon federal funds rates during the crisis. Most notably was the tendency for U.S. banks to build a precautionary buffer of funding in the morning, then lending these funds to the market in the afternoon as banks became more certain of their actual funding needs.
Evolution of CB Dollar Swap Facilities
As pressures in the U.S. dollar funding markets built in late 2007 and through 2008, non-U.S. banks began to report difficulty accessing dollars via the FX swap and other short-term interbank funding markets. The Federal Reserve and foreign central banks engaged in expanded discussions of means of addressing the disruptions in dollar funding markets and the more broadbased dysfunction occurring in money markets. The idea of using a CB swap facility to address money market dysfunction and to achieve broader financial stability contrasted with the goals of most prior CB swap agreements, which had been primarily used as tools of foreign exchange policy. Within the competitive auction classifications, pricing can either be at a single common price or at multiple prices depending on the structure of bids. Though the non-competitive, fixed rate auctions are fully allotted, the use of a higher spread to OIS and potential constraints on banks availability of collateral may limit the demand for dollars.
Auction Types
The broad definitions of auction formats and pricing are provided in the text box below. In general, auctions can have either competitive or non-competitive formats. Pricing conventions can be described as single price, multiple price, or fixed rate, full allotment.
Format Pricing Description competitive single price Bids are accepted from the highest interest rate bid down, until the total auction size is allotted. All allocations are made at the lowest accepted bid rate. multiple price Bids are accepted from the highest interest rate bid down, until the total auction size is allotted. All allocations are made at the respective bid rates of "winning" bidders. non-competitive fixed rate, full allotment
Interest rate is fixed, and all bids received are satisfied subject to collateral requirements. Table 2 presents broad details on the dollar auctions conducted by foreign central banks.
On the quantity side, as previously noted, after October 2008 four central banks did not have prespecified limits on the amounts that can be drawn, while ten other countries were authorized to competitive, single price auction is used. The auction accepts bids at the highest interest rate through successively lower rates. When necessary, bids at the lowest accepted interest rate would be prorated. All participants whose bids have been accepted are awarded funds at the same interest rate, which is the lowest interest rate at which bids were accepted, regardless of the rates at which participants bid for funds. The TAF stop-out rate was also the fixed rate at which the ECB and SNB allotted funds at their CB dollar swap operations prior to the fixed rate, full allotment structure.
The structure and functioning of the reciprocal currency arrangements are closely intertwined with the TAF in that they would facilitate the extension of term dollar liquidity to banks but in overseas jurisdictions. As we already noted, the schedules for the 28-and 84-day dollar auctions conducted by the ECB, BOE, SNB, and BOJ largely coincided with the similar tenor TAF operations. Unlike the fixed rate, full allotment structure of several of the foreign central banks' dollar auctions since October 2008, at the TAF auction a pre-determined fixed supply of funds was offered at each pre-announced date. 4 In practice, each TAF auction that occurred since the auction sizes were increased to $150 billion on October 6, 2008 was undersubscribed. Thus, the cost of dollars at these auctions fell to the minimum bid rate 5 .
The 
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in TAF stop out rates made the cost of dollars from these foreign central bank swap facilities available at a higher rate relative to funds at TAF (Chart 6). In part, the pricing of the fixed rate, full allotment CB swap programs ensured that the facility was available to meet dollar funding demands without hindering the eventual recovery of liquidity in the private eurodollar or foreign exchange swap markets. This structure also reinforced the existence of the CB dollar swaps as backstop liquidity facilities.
For some overseas depository institutions, despite the penalty rate on the swap facilities relative to TAF, the swap facilities remained attractive as long as the cost of funds remained advantageous relative to dollars obtainable in the market. That is, the swap facilities remained attractive to a financial institution as long as its cost of borrowing in the market was more than 100 basis points over OIS. Chart 7 shows the spreads between 1-month and 3-month LIBOR relative to the fixed rate of approximately OIS+100 basis points, with negative values indicating when the average cost of private market dollar funds was cheaper than the funds available through the central bank auction facility. As noted earlier, dollars obtained via the TAF and the CB swap dollars were priced comparably to private market funds as measured by LIBOR prior to September 2008. Thereafter, the swap funds were considerably cheaper than private market rates during the height of the crisis as the spread between LIBOR and OIS widened dramatically.
However, by this measure only 3-month funds remained available more cheaply than private markets from central bank sources (but still more expensive than through TAF) through the first quarter of 2009. The CB dollar swap would still be attractive to those depository institutions that had limited or no access to dollars near the LIBOR fixings. By contrast, the availability of competitively priced TAF funds continued to keep demand for dollars higher and steadier directly from the Federal Reserve. Private market costs of dollars as measured by LIBOR were higher than the TAF. However, a number of factors limit the availability of eligible collateral located in the United States as well as in Europe, possibly constraining foreign participation in the TAF. Some foreign banks' portfolios of Federal Reserve-eligible assets located in the United States were relatively small. Moreover, prudent liquidity management practices for some banks require that part of those assets are left unencumbered to enable access to the discount window on short notice and to enhance the company's rating. In addition, the Federal Reserve applies stringent eligibility criteria which limit the eligible pool of assets located in the ICSDs. Specifically, the eligible assets included foreign government debt, German Jumbo Pfandbriefe, international agency debt, foreign government agency debt, municipal bonds, and corporate bonds. Assetbacked securities and bank loans were not eligible as collateral for the TAF when they are located in Europe, while they are eligible when located in the United States. Furthermore, non-US dollar-denominated instruments must have a market price from a recognized pricing source and a AAA-rating, with the exception of government debt, for which the rating threshold is lower (S&P BBB-, Moody's Baa3). Finally, as in the case of assets located in the United States, not all eligible assets located in Europe could be used to participate in the TAF due to the need to leave a portion unencumbered or for other purposes (e.g., participating in the Eurosystem's euro- Furthermore, the US-based entity of the foreign banking group that would participate in the TAF might be a different legal entity than the entity (e.g., EU-based) that owns the assets deposited in the ICSDs. Meeting collateral requirements of the TAF would require one entity to transfer the ownership title on the assets to the other entity via an intra-group transaction (e.g., a
repo or a bond lending operation). Also considering the potentially small amount of eligible and usable assets located in the two ICSDs, some foreign banks reportedly decided not to invest resources to address these legal and organizational issues and thus were unable to use the eligible assets deposited in the ICSDs.
Haircuts affect the relative attractiveness of facilities. Different haircuts apply to collateral accepted by the Federal Reserve and the ECB. For comparison purposes, we focus on the subset of assets that is eligible in both operations. Assets located in the United States were not eligible to be pledged at the operations carried out by the ECB, because the ECB requires that the assets be deposited/registered (issued) in the European Economic Area 10 and held and settled in the euro area. In contrast, most of the assets in the ICSDs that are eligible to be used as collateral in the TAF are also eligible for the ECB dollar facility.
The lendable value for these assets differed according to the central bank to which they are pledged. In particular, the lendable value for a given amount of euro-denominated assets located in an ICSD was typically higher in the 28-day TAF than in any ECB dollar auction. This was mainly because the ECB applied significantly higher additional initial margins to account for foreign exchange rate risk as part of its risk management framework than the Federal
Reserve. Specifically, the ECB's additional haircuts were 10%, 12%, 17% and 20% for dollar operations with duration of 1-, 7-, 28-and 84-days respectively, while the Federal Reserve's additional FX haircuts range from 2% to 5%, according to the residual maturity of the debt 9 Foreign-owned but globally-oriented banks reported that legal and operational issues could hinder the use of eligible assets deposited with the ICSDs. In particular, the one-off legal preparatory work that is needed to pledge these assets in the TAF could have initially delayed foreign bank participation in the TAF.
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instruments. 11 As a result, there were two margins for haircuts: margins based on the security type and an additional margin if the collateral is denominated in foreign currency.
The relationship between lendable values in the TAF and ECB dollar facility changed when 84-day funds were considered. In fact, a bank would be able to borrow more against eurodenominated assets located in an ICSD in the 84-day ECB dollar auctions than in the TAF. This happens because, since July 30, 2008, the Federal Reserve introduced an additional collateral requirement for advances of more than 28-days. Under this requirement, the total amount of term primary credit and TAF credit with original or remaining term to maturity exceeding 28-days extended to an individual depository institution could not exceed 75% of the lendable value of its available collateral.
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11 For example, the lendable value for euro-denominated foreign government debt located in an ICSD at a 28-day TAF is between 85% and 92% of the assets' market value, depending on the residual maturity of the debt instrument. The lendable value of the same instrument at the ECB dollar auction is instead between 76% and 83% of the assets' market value, depending on the structure of the debt instrument (fixed or zero coupon) and its residual maturity. The lendable value of euro-denominated German Jumbo Pfandbriefe (another relevant asset class) at a 28-day TAF is between 85% and 92% of the assets' market value, depending on the residual maturity, while the corresponding values at the ECB dollar auction are between 73% and 82%. 12 For example, this additional collateral requirement lowers the lendable value for euro-denominated foreign government debt and German Jumbo Pfandbriefe located in an ICSD at an 84-day TAF to between 64% and 69% of the assets' market value, depending on the residual maturity of the debt instrument. 
Collateral and haircuts at dollar auctions by Federal Reserve and ECB
Effects of the CB Swaps on Dollar Funding Markets
The implementation and expansion of the swap lines between the Federal Reserve and the various foreign central banks have been described as significantly ameliorating the cost of dollars shown in the LIBOR-OIS and FX basis spread levels, even if these costs remained elevated by historical measures. 13 In this section, we consider the evidence arising from discussions with market participants, data on the cost of funds to different market segments, and formal econometric studies. effects is the FX swap basis, which is an average implied premium paid for dollar funds in the FX swap market relative to LIBOR. However, it does not fully capture the fact that different market participants likely have varying degrees of access to the unsecured markets -both in the amounts and rates at which counterparties would be willing to lend. For example, if a given bank can borrow euros at EURIBOR but can only borrow dollars at LIBOR + 20 basis points in the unsecured markets, then the FX basis for that bank would be the implied USD funding cost vs.
(LIBOR + 20) rather than LIBOR, resulting in a smaller FX basis. This similarly applies to a banks access to the euro unsecured cash markets used in calculating the implied USD funding cost.
Our discussion of the FX basis emphasized that the first part of the transaction reflects the cost of euros, in terms of interest rates by which euro-area companies acquire liquidity before conversion into dollars via swap markets. However, the aggregate measure for Although the chart only reflects 1 month tenor spreads, the borrowing rate spread between the categories is similar for all maturities. The shorter tenors, such as 1 week, displayed smaller spreads, interpreted as less credit tiering.
4.3 Econometric Analyses. In this section, we do not provide original econometric work but instead interpret the econometric evidence that explores the role of the TAF and CB swaps in bringing down the cost of funds, especially when dollar liquidity conditions were most stressed.
Formal econometric testing has identified some of the effects of the TAF and the CB dollar swaps on market liquidity. In general, these studies begin with high frequency data (generally daily) on financial market indicators -for example, LIBOR to OIS spreads or FX basis swapsand consider the effects of announcements and actual auction events. "Effectiveness" is generally interpreted as a statistically significant and persistent decline in the cost of funds.
Another smaller direction of research considers the relationship between the CB swaps and the impact on conditions in the last four markets (Brazil, Mexico, Korea, and Singapore) in which dollar swaps with the Federal Reserve were announced.
The initial studies of the consequences of the liquidity facilities focused primarily on the TAF, with the CB dollar swaps treated as a related arm of the liquidity facilities. Mishkin (2008) originally argued that the TAF "may have had significant beneficial effects on financial markets", but this claim was met with skepticism by Taylor and Williams (2009) Indeed, the spreads of most emerging markets had started to decline even before the CB swap arrangements were announced. Exchange rates responded significantly for the currencies of the countries with these arrangements, on average appreciating when non-swap country currencies depreciated, however these effects subsequently were reversed.
The general tenor of these few empirical studies of CB dollar swaps is supportive of a role played by the dollar swap facilities on effecting financial variables. This role was achieved through some combination of announcement effects or the actual operations. However, it is important to point out that definitive statements about the consequences of any specific CB 
Conclusions
This paper has provided an overview of the evolution of the reciprocal currency Extraordinary liquidity facilities such as the dollar swap lines are generally implemented to address broad dysfunction in financial markets. However, in crisis periods broad market dysfunction is often accompanied by significant credit tiering across financial firms. Such tiering can persist for some time after the need for broad liquidity provision has receded. As a crisis abates, a key challenge for policymakers is to identify when usage of liquidity support becomes concentrated among "adversely selected" institutions who might continue to rely on such liquidity facilities. The use of penalty rates in pricing such liquidity operations can assist policymakers in making such judgments because penalty rates create economic incentives for participants to exit these programs as the cost of market-based sources of funds returns to more normal levels. 19 McGuire and von Peter (2009b, Figure 7 ) provides details. 
